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1 Introduction
Risks and high volatility in foreign exchange markets lead also to additional
risk for national economies because a lot of their transactions are involved in
foreign exchange. Academics and the popular press often claim that these
risks are caused by destabilizing speculators relying on trends in ﬁnancial
prices who move exchange rates away from their fundamental values. In
this context the following proposition is often heard:
Transaction taxes stabilize the exchange rate because they harm noise traders
more than traders who rely on economic fundamentals.
The analysis of this proposition can be conducted by analyzing if
(i) the number of non-fundamental equilibria is reduced through the cur-
rency transaction tax,
(ii) during the out of equilibrium dynamics the market is dominated by
stabilizing traders, while noise traders are crowded out.
For this purpose we generalized the nonlinear exchange rate model by De-
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) for currency transaction taxes. This Brock-
Hommes-style model1 assumes two types of traders: a stabilizing funda-
mental based trader type and a destabilizing trend chasing one. Traders are
allowed to change their trading rule according to the past success of their
trading strategy. Therefore the market can be dominated by one group of
traders for some time periods. We analyze the out-of equilibrium dynamics
of the model using impulse response analysis by shocking the system such
that the exchange rate deviates from the fundamental steady state so that
we can study its way of convergence back to this equilibrium. For the study
1See Brock and Hommes (1997) for a description of this model class.Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 2
of the possible reduction of speculative equilibria through currency trans-
action taxes we rely on numerical bifurcation analysis where we plot the
equilibria emerging from the model against varying values of the tax rate.
Similar models of this area of research are those used in Westerhoﬀ (2003)
and Ehrenstein, Westerhoﬀ and Stauﬀer (2003) who also study the eﬀective-
ness of currency transaction taxes. Westerhoﬀ (2003) ﬁnds that small trans-
action taxes reduce exchange rate volatility while high transaction taxes
increase the volatility. In his study this is due to the fact that low tax rates
crowd out destabilizing traders while high tax rates crowd out stabilizing
traders.
The following results emerge. After a shock hits the system in the baseline
simulation without taxes the exchange rate and the population fractions
of traders converged back to their fundamental steady state values. After
the impulse the exchange rate overshoots but a then a trend reversal occurs
with a convergence back to the fundamental equilibrium. After the shock hit
the system the number of fundamental based traders rise sharply to 100%,
while after the trend reversal trend chasing traders dominated the market.
Because this dominance occurs after the trend reversal back to the funda-
mental value these traders do not lead to a destabilization. Variations of the
currency transaction tax rate reveal that a positive tax rate helps the sys-
tem to converge faster to the steady state. The bifurcation analysis reveals
that the model displays a fundamental equilibrium and multiple specula-
tive equilibria. We ﬁnd out that a transaction tax larger than 2% leads to
diminishing speculative equilibria, such that the fundamental steady-state
is the only remaining equilibrium. A sensitivity analysis shows that this
result is robust for a wide range of values of the behavioral parameters of
the model. A stochastic simulation of the model shows that it is able to pro-Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 3
duce realistic exchange rate time series which makes is usable for economic
policy analysis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section in-
troduces the economic model. Section three contains the solution to this
model, while section four contains the numerical analysis of the proposition
above with the help of the model. Section ﬁve concludes.
2 The Model’s Building Blocks
The model used for economic policy analysis in this paper is a generalized
version of the model developed by DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) by cur-
rency transaction taxes. If the transaction tax rate is zero then our model
collapses to their model. This nonlinear exchange rate model consists of the
following building blocks:
(i) agents’ optimal portfolio decision within a mean-variance utility
framework,
(ii) agents’ forecasts of the future exchange rate based upon simple rules
of thumb,
(iii) evaluation of these trading rules based upon a comparison of their
risk-adjusted proﬁtability,
(iv) a policy maker who sets the transaction tax rate.
In the next subsections we will describe these building blocks in more detail.Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 4
2.1 Demand and Supply of Foreign Assets
Our ﬁnancial market is populated by agents with the identiﬁcation number
1,...,i − 1,i,i + 1,...,N. We assume agents to be heterogeneous in their
expectations about their future wealth W i
t+1 and the future risk of their
wealth. The individual agent’s preferences towards risk can be represented















where µ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, Ei
t(W i
t+1) is agent i’s con-
ditional expectation of his future wealth, while V ari
t(W i
t+1) is his portfolio
variance.
The evolution of the individual trader’s wealth is speciﬁed as follows
W
i
t+1 = (1 + r
∗)(1 − τ)st+1di,t + (1 + r)(W
i
t − stdi,t), (2)
where r and r∗ are the domestic and foreign interest rates which are assumed
to be constant over time, while st is the exchange rate between the domestic
and foreign country, di,t is the trader’s holdings of foreign assets held at time
t, while τ is the transaction tax rate which will be levied if the agent wants
to invest into foreign assets. Thus, (1+r∗)(1−τ)st+1di,t represents the value
of the foreign portfolio denominated in domestic currency at time t+1, while
(1 + r)(W i
t − stdi,t) represents the value of the domestic portfolio at time
t + 1.
By maximizing equation (1) with respect to the budget constraint (2) we
get the following demand function for foreign assets as the solution to this
portfolio allocation problem:Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 5
di,t =
(1 + r∗)(1 − τ)Ei













Thus, the demand for foreign assets rises, if the foreign interest rate r∗ rises
or if the domestic interest rate r falls. It also rises if the future exchange
rate is expected to rise. The demand will decrease if the risk of the future
exchange rate is expected to rise or if the transaction tax rate τ rises.




ni,tdi,t = Dt, (5)
where ni,t is the number of agents of type i.
Following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) the market supply for foreign
assets Xt is assumed to be exogenous and determined by the net current
account and by the sales and purchases of foreign currency by the domestic
and foreign central banks. Market equilibrium is given if market demand
equals market supply
Xt = Dt. (6)
The market clearing exchange rate can be calculated by substituting the





(1 + r∗)(1 − τ)Ei




and solving for the exchange rate st. This we will do by dividing both sidesMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 6
by
 N


















































































From this equation we get the information that the equilibrium exchange
rate depends on the exogenous supply of foreign assets Xt, the domestic and
foreign interest rates and the weighted sum of the traders’ forecasts of the
future exchange rate which are characterized by behavioral heterogeneity.
In the following subsection we will model these behavioral heterogeneity in
more detail.Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 7
2.2 Forecasting Models and Trading Rules
Following the literature of heterogeneous agents model of ﬁnancial markets2
we assume that the market is populated by two types of traders3. The ﬁrst
group of traders is called fundamental traders or arbitrageurs in the litera-
ture. This trader types searches for assets which are over- or undervalued
with respect to a fundamental value. Let us denote this fundamental ex-
change rate by s∗
t and the diﬀerence between the realized exchange rate and
the fundamental exchange rate st − s∗
t as the misalignment.
The arbitrageurs’ forecasting rule expects the exchange rate to rise, if the
realized exchange rate is smaller than the fundamental exchange rate and
he expects the exchange rate to fall back to its fundamental value if the real-
ized exchange rate lies above its fundamental value. Thus the arbitrageurs’
forecasting rule can be speciﬁed as follows
E
f
t (∆st+1) = −ψ(st−1 − s
∗
t−1), (13)
where ∆st+1 = st+1 − st. Thus, this trader type assumes that ψ·100% of
the misalignment will be corrected by the future exchange rate change.
Following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) we assume that fundamental
traders behave diﬀerently depending on whether the exchange rate lies
within or outside a transaction cost band of width C. This changes their
2See Brock and Hommes (1997), Chiarella and He (2002) and Westerhoﬀ (2003) to get
an overview over this model class.
3This assumption is based on the empirical ﬁnding of Taylor and Allen (1992) who
conducted a survey at the London Foreign Exchange about the trading rules of traders.









t−1), |st−1 − s∗
t−1| > C;
0, |st−1 − s∗
t−1| < C.
(14)
Thus, if the exchange rate lies outside the transaction cost band, arbi-
trageurs believe the misalignment to be corrected by the future exchange
rate change, while they believe that the exchange rate will not change if
it lies within the transaction cost band. The rationale behind this is that
arbitrage will not function within the transaction cost band. So there will
be no mechanism to correct the misalignment.
The chartist traders or technical traders how they are often denoted in the
literature bet on lasting trends in the exchange rate. Thus, this trader type
computes a moving average of past exchange rate changes and extrapolates








If we plug these forecasting models into the demand functions for foreign
currency developed in the former section, we can derive the following trading
rules. The arbitrageurs’ trading rule will be
df,t =
(1 + r∗)(1 − τ)(st − φ(st−1 − s∗




while the technical trading rule will be
dc,t =
(1 + r∗)(1 − τ)(st + β
 T




Thus, fundamental based traders purchase or sell currency, when a misalign-Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 9
ment arises, while technical traders purchase or sell currency when trends
in the exchange rate arise. The ﬁrst trading strategy stabilizes the exchange
rate, while the second one destabilizes by amplifying trends.
In the next subsection we will elaborate on the agents’ portfolio risk evalu-
ation which is also characterized by behavioral heterogeneity.
2.3 Risk Evaluation
Following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) agents evaluate their portfolio












The weights can be computed as θk = θ(1 − θ)k. Following these authors
arbitrageurs take the deviation of the market exchange rate from the fun-
damental value into account in addition to the forecast error. This changes











1 + (st − s∗
t)2 (19)
So if the misalignment st−s∗
t increases arbitrageurs become more conﬁdent
that the exchange rate will convert back to the fundamental value, thus
their risk perception declines. If the market displays higher volatility risk
averse traders reduce their demand for foreign currency, while they increase
it if the market is in a period of low volatility.
Now we ﬁnished the agents’ portfolio decision problem and the involved
components forecasting rules and risk evaluation. What remains is to intro-Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 10
duce an evolutionary mechanism that tells us which trading rule the agent
prefers most. This problem will be tackled in the next subsection.
2.4 Evaluation of Trading Rules
The evaluation of the two trading rules follows the idea of Brock and
Hommes (1997) who claim to use discrete choice probabilities to compute
the fraction of agents using a particular trading rule. Following DeGrauwe


















c,t is the risk-adjusted realized proﬁt of the technical trading rule,
where the parameter γ can be interpreted as the intensity of choice, which
measures how strong agents react to changes in their proﬁts. The risk-
adjusted proﬁts are calculated as follows
π
′
i,t−1 = πi,t−1 − µσ
2
i,t−1, (21)
where πi,t−1 is agent i’s realized past proﬁt, µ is his degree of risk-aversion,
while σ2
i,t−1 measures his portfolio risk.





































    
    
1, for x > 0;
0, for x = 0;
−1, for x < 0.
(24)
From this equation we can infer that the transaction tax rate not only has
an eﬀect on the traders’ demand for foreign currency by also has a direct
eﬀect on the evaluation and choice of trading rules. Thus, a high transaction
tax may agents’ prevent to use a trading rule which might be very proﬁtable
with no tax levied.
These are the building blocks the model consists of. The next section will
present the solution to this model and the calculation of the model’s equi-
libria.
3 Solution of the Model
For solving the model we can restrict it without loss of generality to a
simpler one. In this section we calculate the model’s equilibria and check if
the transaction tax changes them. The most interesting point to analyze is
if the currency transaction tax changes the fundamental steady-state. After
solving for the fundamental steady-state we are prepared for a detailed
analysis of the policy eﬀects of the transaction tax which will be done in
the chapter thereafter.Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 12
3.1 A Simpliﬁed Version of the Model
Following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) we use a simpliﬁed version of
the model presented in order to get some analytical results. We simplify
the model by assuming zero transaction cost in the goods market C = 0.
Interest rates in the domestic and foreign country can be normalized to
zero r = r∗ = 0, while also the fundamental interest rate is assumed to be
constant in time and normalized to zero s∗
t = 0 without loss of generality.
Moreover, we restrict our analysis on only two types of traders: chartists
and fundamental based traders.



































as the new population fractions of agents and assuming the following sim-
pliﬁed forecasting rules for chartists
E
c




t st+1 = (1 − ψ)st−1 (29)Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 13
we can simplify the closed form solution for the market clearing exchange
rate to
st = (1 − τ)
 
st−1 + Θc,tβ(st−1 − st−2) − Θf,tψst−1
 
. (30)
This equation can be interpreted as follows. In econometric language
the exchange rate equation consists of two parts: an autoregressive part
Θc,tβ(st−1 − st−2) and a mean-reverting part −Θf,tψst−1. If the weight of
the autoregressive part Θc,t is large then the exchange rate will diverge
from its fundamental value which we normalized to zero. This is the case if
the number of trend-chasing traders is large compared to the fundamental
traders. If the weight of the mean-reverting part Θf,t is large then the ex-
change rate will be close to its fundamental value. This is the case if if the
number of fundamental traders is large compared to the number of chartist
traders. This fundamental traders have a stabilizing eﬀect on the exchange
rate while chartist traders have a destabilizing eﬀect. If a tax levied on for-
eign exchange transactions should stabilize the exchange rate these eﬀects
have to be taken into account. If the tax harms fundamental traders more
than chartist traders the eﬀect of the transaction tax might be destabilizing,
while it might be stabilizing if it harms technical trading rules and favors
fundamental-based trading rules.
Under these simplifying assumptions chartists’ risk perception collapses to
σ
2












(1 + β)xt−1 − βzt−1 − st−1
 2, (32)Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 14
while the arbitrageurs’ risk perception simpliﬁes to
σ
2









1 + (st−1)2 (33)





(1 − ψ)xt−1 − st−1
 2
1 + (st−1)2 , (34)
where ut, xt and zt are deﬁned as
ut := st−1 (35)
xt := ut−1 (36)
zt := xt−1. (37)
The fundamental traders’ realized proﬁts simplify to
πf,t−1 =
 















(1 − φ)xt−1(1 − τ) − ut−1
 
,
while the technical traders’ proﬁts simplify to
πc,t−1 =
 















(xt−1 + β(xt−1 − zt−1)(1 − τ) − ut−1
 
.Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 15
Thus, the dynamical system can be expressed as














f,t = (1 − θ)σ
2
f,t−1 + θ












f,t−1)} + exp{γ(πc,t−1 − µσ2
c,t−1)}
πf,t−1 = (st−1(1 − τ) − ut−1)sign
 
(1 − ψ)xt−1(1 − τ) − ut−1
 
πc,t−1 = (st−1(1 − τ) − ut−1)sign
 
(xt−1 + β(xt−1zt−1))(1 − τ) − ut−1
 
In the following subsection we will use these equations to calculate the
model’s fundamental steady-state. Moreover, these equations can be used
later on for the numerical analysis of the model.
3.2 The Fundamental Steady-State
For the system to be in the steady-state all variables should remain constant
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This means, that in the steady-state all variables are constant and equal to
their long-run equilibrium values s, u, x, z, σ2
f, and σ2
c.



















,πc = 0,πf = 0. (43)
Thus, in the steady-state 50% of all traders are fundamental value traders,
50% are chartists, and all proﬁts are zero because there are no arbitrage
opportunities left. Moreover, it can be seen that changes in the transaction
tax rate τ have no inﬂuence on the fundamental steady-state of the system.
The economic interpretation of this is that transaction taxes do not change
the long-run average returns on holding foreign currency. They only change
the transitory out-of-equilibrium behavior of the model.
Because in DeGrauwe and Grimaldi’s (2006) model, which is a special case
of our model, one is not able to perform a local stability analysis based on
the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady-state, we
are also not able do this for our model. The reason is that the nonlinear
map is not diﬀerentiable at the steady-state. Therefore, we have to rely on
numerical methods to analyze the properties of the model and to conduct
the economic policy analysis. This we will do in the following section.Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 17
4 Numerical Analysis
In this part we check the behavior of the model by numerical simulations.
At ﬁrst we analyze how the deterministic skeleton of the model behaves
after the model is shocked by a deviation of the exchange rate from the
fundamental steady-state. The behavior of the fundamental steady-state
and the speculative steady states will be analyzed later on using bifurcation
analysis. After that we study the behavior of a stochastic simulation of the
model.
4.1 Impulse Response Analysis
The deterministic skeleton of the model is given by the equations given


















,πc = 0,πf = 0. (45)
We shock the system by introducing a deviation of the exchange rate from
this steady-state and study how the systems trajectories return back to this
equilibrium. With the help of this impulse response analysis we can get
information about the stability of the system and about the time length of
disequilibria. Our research strategy is to perform a baseline simulation with-
out transaction taxes and to compare its result to simulations with diﬀerent
transaction tax rates. The following ﬁgures represent impulse response se-Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 18
ries from the models variables after the model is shocked by a deviation
of the exchange rate from the fundamental steady state. Thus, all impulse
responses a measured in deviations from the steady-state which is given by
the red brocken lines.

















































Fig. 1: Impulse Responses of the Exchange Rate
The impulse responses in the upper subﬁgure represent the baseline case with a transaction
tax rate τ = 0%, while the impulse responses lower subﬁgure are based on transaction tax
rates τ = 3%. The remaining parameter values are ψ = 0.5, β = 0.5, θ = 0.5, γ = 1,
and µ = 1.
This ﬁrst subﬁgure of Fig. 1 shows us the hump-shaped response of the
exchange rate to a disturbance to the system. As we can see, after the shock
the exchange rate overshoots for 2.5 degrees of measure while trend reversal
occurs after that. The exchange rate then returns back to its steady-state
after 25 periods of time. The subﬁgure below shows the same response
as a thin line and the response of the exchange rate after the same shockMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 19
but under a transaction tax of 3% represented by the thick line. As we can
inspect, the overshooting is much smaller and convergence to the equilibrium
is faster. In this simulation the fundamental steady-state is reached after
15 periods.
The following ﬁgure shows the response of the population of stabilizing
fundamental traders after the same shock.


























































Fig. 2: Impulse Responses of the Population of Fundamental Traders
The impulse responses in the upper subﬁgure represent the baseline case with a transaction
tax rate τ = 0%, while the impulse responses lower subﬁgure are based on transaction tax
rates τ = 3%. The remaining parameter values are ψ = 0.5, β = 0.5, θ = 0.5, γ = 1,
and µ = 1.
Again, the subﬁgure above represents the baseline case with no transaction
tax levied on sells and purchases of foreign currency, while the subﬁgures
below represent the responses of the population of stabilizing fundamental
traders under transaction tax rates of 3% and 5%. The dotted red line at 1/2
represents the population fraction when the system is in the fundamentalMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 20
equilibrium. When the system is shocked the population of fundamentalist
traders is rising to 100%, because the initialized deviation from steady-state
rises their demand for foreign currency. Thus, they are trading against this
deviation. This stabilizes the exchange rate as we saw in the ﬁgure before.
The exchange rate is converging back to its fundamental value. After ten
periods of dominance in the market their number is decreasing sharply to
a value below its steady-state value of 1/2. This means that now a period
of dominance of chartist traders begins. Because fundamental traders are
trading against the misalignment this creates a trend of the exchange rate
towards its fundamental value. This rises the chartists’ demand for foreign
currency. After 26 periods the population fractions are back at their steady-
state value where they remain. Under a transaction tax rate of 3% we reach
a faster convergence of the exchange rate towards its fundamental steady-
state as we saw in the ﬁgure before. This faster convergence corresponds
with the following ﬁnding. Under a 3% transaction tax rate the decline of
the fundamental traders’ population is much more abrupt and also larger.
This you can see by comparing the thick and the thin line where the thin line
represents the baseline case. Thus, under a positive transaction tax rate the
number of chartist traders rises much more after the fundamental traders
purchases of domestic currency leads to a trend reversal back to the steady-
state. Because the trend is much stronger than in the baseline case, more
trend chasers rise their demand for foreign currency. This reaction leads
to the fact, that the convergence of the exchange rate and the convergence
of the population towards their steady-state values is much faster under a
positive tax rate. Thus, the currency transaction tax uses the chartists’
trend chasing behavior in a positive way to stabilize the exchange rate.
Thus, with the help of the impulse response analysis we could show thatMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 21
the system near the steady state is stable but that transaction taxes help
to eliminate misalignments much faster. Our ﬁndings verify the proposition
that transaction taxes stabilize the exchange rate by crowding out trend
chasing traders in favor of stabilizing fundamental based traders, because
the dominance of fundamental based trades stabilizes the exchange rate.
But we also ﬁnd that after fundamentalist trades lead to a reversal of the
trend towards the fundamental value chartist traders do not harm the sys-
tem anymore but help to reach a faster convergence. Remind that these
results are only valid if we start from the fundamental steady state and
when the shocks are small. If a shock is large enough the exchange rate can
also converge to one of the numerous speculative equilibria.
After this local analysis of the behavior near the steady state the following
part analyzes the qualitative properties of the model by analyzing how the
number of speculative equilibria changes under a variation of the transaction
tax rate.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis via Bifurcation Diagrams
In this section we analyze how the model changes its qualitative results
due to parameter variations with the help of bifurcation diagrams. In this
diagrams we plot the fundamental and speculative steady-states against
diﬀerent parameter values, where we will put most weight on our policy
variable which is the transaction tax rate. Remind, that this section does
not analyze the dynamics of the system but only the occurrence of equilibria
under diﬀerent parameter values.
The simulation tool we use for our analysis of equilibria is the bifurcation
diagram in which equilibria are plotted against values of the parameter ofMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 22
interest. In our case this will be the behavioral parameters of fundamental
and trend chasing traders and our policy variable the currency transaction
tax rate. We construct these diagrams by Monte-Carlo simulation tech-
niques. The simulation consists of the following steps
(i) we draw a starting value for the exchange rate s0 from a probability
distribution,
(ii) then we simulate the deterministic part of the model until the steady-
state is reached,
(iii) we save this equilibrium value,
(iv) steps (i) to (iii) are repeated several times in order to calculate all
equilibria of the model,
(v) we save all equilibrium values for the parameter value we have used,
(vi) we repeat steps (i) to (v) for diﬀerent values of the parameter we want
to analyze,
(vii) we plot equilibria against parameter values.
Fig. 3 shows a bifurcation diagram where the model’s equilibria are plotted
against our policy variable, the currency transaction tax rate. Again, the
fundamental equilibrium is normalized to zero.
As you can see the baseline case without transaction taxes is given at the
left of the x-axis of this diagram, where the transaction tax rate is zero. For
this parameter value a lot of equilibria emerge. Because this is a stochastic
simulation only those equilibria are plotted which occur most frequently.
This means the fundamental steady state is not reached, because the spec-
ulative equilibria occur more frequently. These speculative equilibria are
distributed in a range of ±0.5 around the fundamental steady state. WhenMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 23





































Fig. 3: Bifurcation Analysis: Change of the Transaction Tax Rate
This ﬁgure plots the models equilibria for diﬀerent values of the transaction tax rate. The
remaining parameter values are ψ = 0.5, β = 0.5, θ = 0.5, γ = 1, and µ = 1.
we rise the transaction tax rate this range gets symmetrically smaller and
the number of speculative equilibria is declining. For a transaction tax rate
of 2% the fundamental steady-state is the only equilibrium point of the
model. Thus, in this case, our system will converge back to the fundamen-
tal equilibrium after a shock which leads to a temporary disequilibrium.
Remind that for tax rates smaller than 2% the system can also rest in an
speculative equilibrium after a shock. The result of this analysis is that pos-
itive transaction taxes larger than 2% lead to a stabilization of the system
by reducing the number of speculative equilibria to zero.
Figure ?? shows a bifurcation diagram at the point, where the transaction
tax is 2% but where we vary the fundamentalist forecasting parameter φ
between zero and one in order to robust how robust our results above are.
From this ﬁgure we can infer that our results are robust for a wide range
of fundamentalist error correction parameters. For all parameter values in
the interval ]0,1] we have only the fundamental equilibrium despite the caseMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 24








































Fig. 4: Bifurcation Analysis: Change of the Fundamentalist Forecasting
Parameter
This ﬁgure plots the models equilibria for diﬀerent values of the fundamentalist forecast-
ing parameter φ. The remaining parameter values are τ = 0.02, β = 0.5, θ = 0.5, γ = 1,
and µ = 1.
φ = 0, where fundamentalist expect the exchange rate to follow a random
walk. In this special case we again get multiple equilibria.
In Figure ?? we use the bifurcation diagram at τ = 2% but we vary the
technical traders trend extrapolation parameter β here in order to check the
robustness of our results above.
From this ﬁgure we can infer that our ﬁndings are also robust for a wide
range of values of the chartists’ extrapolation parameter β. For values
of this parameter between 0.1 and 1 the fundamental equilibrium is the
only possible equilibrium point while for values between 0 and 0.1 we have
multiple equilibria although the transaction tax is 2%.Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 25





































Fig. 5: Bifurcation Analysis: Change of the Technical Traders Trend
Extrapolation Parameter
This ﬁgure plots the models equilibria for diﬀerent values of the chartist forecasting pa-
rameter β. The remaining parameter values are τ = 0.02, φ = 0.5, θ = 0.5, γ = 1, and
µ = 1.
4.3 Stochastic Simulation
Following DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) in line with authors like Brock
and Hommes (1997), Chiarella and He (2002) and Westerhoﬀ (2003) we





t−1 + εt, (46)
where εt is a normally distributed mean zero random variable. In contrast
to the deterministic case, were we set the fundamental exchange rate to
zero, here we have to put it into the system of equations.Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 26
In this case the market clearing exchange rate equation will be extended to
st = (1 − τ)
 




= (1 − τ)
 





= (1 − τ)
 









f,t = (1 − θ)σ
2
f,t−1 + θ
[(1 − ψ)xt−1 + ψs∗
t−3 − st−1]2
1 + (st−1 − s∗
t−1)2 . (48)
In the case of stochastic fundamental values, the realized proﬁts of funda-
mentalists change to
πf,t−1 = (st−1(1 − τ) − ut−1)sign[((1 − ψ)xt−1 + ψs
∗
t−3)(1 − τ) − ut−1].
(49)Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 27



























































































Fig. 6: Stochastic Simulation of the Model
The model is simulated with a transaction tax rate τ = 0%. The remaining parameter
values are ψ = 0.2, β = 0.8, θ = 0.6, γ = 1, and µ = 1. The standard deviation of the
fundamental shock is σ = 1. Red lines represent fundamental equilibrium values.
From the stochastic simulation in Figure ?? we can see that the model is
able to reproduce realistic time series behavior of the exchange rate because
it follows a random walk like behavior which looks similar than empirical
time series. As you can see the exchange rate displays periods where itMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 28
deviates from its fundamental variable and periods where it is attracted from
its fundamental value. As we have seen before, this corresponds to periods
where the market is either dominated by trend chasing traders or dominated
by fundamental based traders as can be inferred from the subﬁgure at the
bottom and as explained the section before. The exchange rate returns do
not really display volatility clustering like in empirical return time series.
This is not problematic because we do not want to reproduce all stylized
facts4 but our aim was to conduct economic policy analysis. All in all, the
model is able to reproduce some features of empirical exchange rate time
series which makes it usable for economic policy analysis.
A conclusion for this section is that the currency transaction tax rate is able
to stabilize the exchange rate by leading to a faster elimination of temporary
disequilibria after small shocks and near the steady-state. Remind that the
exchange rate can also switch to a speculative equilibrium if the shock is
large enough. Moreover, we found out that the tax is able to reduce the
number of speculative equilibria to zero. Thus, the currency transaction tax
might be an eﬀective policy tool for stabilizing exchange rates.
5 Conclusion
In this study we wanted to analyze the following proposition:
Transaction taxes stabilize the exchange rate because they harm noise traders
more than traders who rely on economic fundamentals
which is often part of academic research and also often to be read in the
popular press. From this proposition we get the following points to analyze
4For a model that reproduces all stylized facts of ﬁnancial time series see Lux and
Marchesi (****).Markus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 29
(i) the number of non-fundamental equilibria is reduced through the cur-
rency transaction tax,
(ii) during the out of equilibrium dynamics the market is dominated by
stabilizing traders, while noise traders are crowded out.
For this purpose we generalized the nonlinear exchange rate model by De-
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005) for currency transaction taxes. This Brock-
Hommes-style model assumes two types of traders: a stabilizing fundamen-
tal based trader type and a destabilizing trend chasing one. Traders are
allowed to change their trading rule according to the past success of their
trading strategy. Therefore the market can be dominated by one group of
traders for some time periods. We analyze the out-of equilibrium dynamics
of the model using impulse response analysis by shocking the system such
that the exchange rate deviates from the fundamental steady state and stud-
ied its convergence back to this equilibrium. For the study of the possible
reduction of speculative equilibria through transaction taxes we relied on
numerical bifurcation analysis where we plot the equilibria emerging from
the model against varying parameter values. The parameter we were most
interested in was our policy variable.
The following results emerged. After a shock to the system the exchange
rate and the population fractions of traders converged back to their funda-
mental steady state values. After the impulse the exchange rate overshot but
the a trend reversal occurred with a convergence back to the fundamental
equilibrium. After the shock the number of fundamental based traders rise
sharply to 100%, after the trend reversal trend chasing traders dominated
the market. Because this domination was after the trend reversal back to the
fundamental value these traders did not lead to a destabilization. SummingMarkus Demary - Currency Transaction Taxes 30
up this point we found that a positive transaction tax helped the system
to converge faster to the steady state. The bifurcation analysis revealed
that the model displays a fundamental equilibrium and multiple speculative
equilibria. A transaction tax larger than 2% leads to diminishing specula-
tive equilibria, so that the fundamental steady-state is the only remaining
equilibrium. A sensitivity analysis showed that this result is robust for a
wide range of values of the model’s behavioral parameters. A stochastic
simulation of the model shows that it is able to produce realistic exchange
rate time series which makes is usable for economic policy analysis.
Summing up, the model shows that stabilization policy is not necessary
after small shocks because the system is stable near the fundamental equi-
librium. But positive transaction taxes help to eliminate misalignments
faster. Moreover, the model shows that positive transaction taxes are nec-
essary if shocks are large because then the economy might stuck in one of the
multiple speculative equilibria. Our second result was that these equilibria
can be eliminated if the transaction tax is high enough.
Future research should ﬁnd out how large these shocks are and how often
speculative equilibria are reached. This should give us more hints about the
necessity of currency transaction taxes.
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